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Abstract
We propose a stochastic map model of economic dynamics. In the last decade,
an array of observations in economics has been investigated in the econophysics
literature, a major example being the universal features of inequality in terms of
income and wealth. Another area of inquiry is the formation of opinion in a society.
The proposed model attempts to produce positively skewed distributions and the
power law distributions as has been observed in the real data of income and wealth.
Also, it shows a non-trivial phase transition in the opinion of a society (opinion
formation). A number of physical models also generates similar results. In particular,
the kinetic exchange models have been especially successful in this regard. Therefore,
we compare the results obtained from these two approaches and discuss a number
of new features and drawbacks of this model.
1 Introduction
It is known that the distributions of income and wealth possess some robust
and stable features which are independent of the economy-specific conditions
[1]. But the exact form of the distribution is still debated [2]. It has been a
tradition in the economics literature to model the left tail and the mode of the
distributions of the incomes with a log-normal [3] distribution and the right
tail with a Pareto distribution i.e., a power law [4]. However, a number of
recent studies in econophysics literature argue that the left tail and the mode
of the distribution is best described by the exponential or gamma distribution
and the right tail of the distribution follows a power law (See Ref. [5,6,8]). Also,
a significant number of attempts have been devoted to explain the emergence
of a consensus in a society and the possibility of a non-trivial phase-transition
in the average opinion of the society (See Ref. [25,26]).
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Here, we propose a stochastic map which attempts to produce all of the afore-
mentioned features at different limits and in addition, it shows some new
features as well. Below, we propose the model and discuss its relative merits
and demerits with respect to the kinetic exchange models which also generates
similar results. For related literature, see Ref. [1,7,8,15] for theoretical and nu-
merical results on the kinetic exchange models of markets. See Ref. [9,10,11]
for detailed analysis of the limit distributions of the solution of random dif-
ference equations (of the form x(t) = a(t)x(t − 1) + b(t); we will use only a
few very particular instances of it). Ref. [12] characterizes gamma distribution
which arises from a random difference equation. Ref. [20] was the first paper
that suggested that multi-agent interactions in the kinetic wealth exchange
models can be simplified and and viewed from from the point of view of a sin-
gle agent. Ref. [14] was possibly the first paper that connected the stochastic
maps and the kinetic exchange models.
2 The map
The Kolkata kinetic wealth exchange models have been successful to generate
a realistic description of the income/wealth distributions (See ref. [8]). Many-
body interactions are the key ingredients of this class of (kinetic) exchange
models. In this paper, we mainly use a single agent framework to discuss the
distributional issues. There is no agent-agent interaction in this model. In this
regard, our treatment is closer to the representative agent paradigm of the
modern economics. The specific structure of the market is also not discussed
here. We represent the interaction of the agent with the market with a map
of the following form,
m(t) = min {(λ1 + ǫtλ2)m(t− 1) + ξtλn3 , θ} (1)
where λ1, λ2 and λ3 are linear functions of a single parameter λ with 0 ≤
λ ≤ 1 such that 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 for i=1, 2 and 3. We assume that −∞ ≤
n ≤ 1, θ takes value either a positive, finite value (we assume θ = 1, for
convinience) or∞ (or a sufficiently large value) and ǫt, ξt ∼ uniform[0, 1] and
independent, unless specified. In all the simulations, we have assumed m(0)
= 1. We denote the time index by subscripts for exogenous random variables
(ǫ and ξ) which we shall drop when no confusion arises. While the parameter
space is seemingly too large to be considered in details, we shall restrict it
considerably by assuming very simple forms of λi for all i.
We can interpret it in the following way. An agent has m(t) amount of wealth
(or money) at time t of which he saves a random fraction and invests the rest.
His return from investment is represented by the additive term ξtλ
n
3 . However,
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there is an upper limit ofm(t) represented by θ. Since we interpret the random
multiplicative term as the savings propensity, we assume that λ1 + ǫtλ2 ≤ 1
for all t i.e., savings propensity is never greater than 1. Our interest lies in
finding the pdf (probability density function P (m)) in the steady state.
It may be noted that the above map (ignoring θ) has the general form
m(t) = a(t)m(t− 1) + b(t) (2)
which has been studied in great details by Ref. [9,10,11]. In this paper, we have
focused on a few particular instances of it for our purpose. Ref. [14] mapped
the asset exchange models into ‘random iterated function systems’. But it
was concerned with the ‘yard-sale’ model and the ‘theft-and-fraud’ model (see
Ref. [13]) whereas we focus on the CC and CCM models (the models that
introduced fixed and distributed savings propensities in the kinetic exchange
models; see Ref. [8]) and that is why we have borrowed the basic structure (a
fraction of the total wealth is saved and the rest is invested) from the Kolkata
wealth exchange models (i.e., the CC and CCM models).
3 Statistical features of the map at some limits
3.1 A positively skewed distribution
We assume λ1 = λ, λ2 = λ3 = 1−λ, n = 1 and θ →∞. The equation becomes
m(t + 1) = {λ+ ǫ(1− λ)}m(t) + ξ(1− λ). (3)
See Fig. 1 for steady state distributions corresponding to different values of
λ. We restrict our attention to the case n = 1 as opposed to other positive
numbers, for two reasons. One, this choice of n makes the average a constant,
independent of n (as the CC and CCM models; see Ref. [8]) and secondly, to
simplify the calculations. We will relax this assumption in Section 3.2 where
we will assume n is negative and we will see that the exponents of the power
law distributions differ for different values of n.
Though we do not know the exact algebraic form of the steady state distri-
butions produced by Eqn. 3, we can find out its moments in order to describe
them qualitatively. We can ignore the time index in the steady state. Taking
expectations over both sides of Eqn. 3, we get
〈m〉 = 1. (4)
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Fig. 1.
Steady state distributions generated by Eqn. 3: Three cases are shown above,
viz., λ = 0 (+), λ = 0.4 (×), λ = 0.7 ( ∗). All simulations are done for ∼ 105
time steps and averaged over for ∼ 104.
Also, we have the variance of m as
V (m) = 〈x2〉 − 〈x〉2 (5)
where x = (λ+ ǫ(1− λ))m + ξ(1 − λ). Now, we make a few almost trivial
observations. Note the fact that 〈x〉 = 1. Hence, 〈m2〉 can be written as
V (m) + 〈m〉2 (by defn. of V (m)) i.e., V (m) + 1. Also, ǫ and ξ are uniformly
distributed. Therefore, 〈ǫ〉 = 1/2 = 〈ξ〉 and 〈ǫ2〉 = 1/3 = 〈ξ2〉 (recall that V (ǫ)
= 1/12 = V (ξ)). Using all of these and by expanding Eqn. 5 we get
V (m)= [λ2 + λ(1− λ) + 1
3
(1− λ)2] (V (m) + 1)
+
1
3
(1− λ)2 + 1
2
(1− λ2)− 1.
Simplifying the above expression we get the result for λ 6= 1,
V (m) =
1
2
(
1− λ
2 + λ
)
(6)
which clearly shows that the distribution tends to a delta function as λ→ 1.
With λ = 0, Eqn. 3 produces a distribution with a sharp peak at m very close
to 1. However, for λ > 0.3 this sharpness goes away.
One can consider an even simpler case with ξt =ǫt for all t so that the map
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becomes
m(t + 1) = λm(t) + ǫ(1− λ) (m(t) + 1) (7)
which is almost the same as the usual kinetic exchange model with a constant
savings factor i.e., the CC model (See Ref. [27]; See also Ref. [8]),
mi(t+ 1) = λmi(t) + ǫ(1− λ) (mi(t) +mj(t)) . (8)
The variance of the distribution generated by Eqn.7 is given by
V (m) =
(
1− λ
2 + λ
)
. (9)
For the sake of completeness, we mention that the variance of the distribution
generated by Eqn. 8 is given by (See Ref. [28])
V (m) =
(1− λ)
(1 + 2λ)
. (10)
It is noteworthy that for λ = 0, the distribution generated by Eqn. 7 has
a peculiar form which is known as Dickman distiburtion (see Ref. [19]). For
m ≤ 1, P (m) is flat and for m > 1, the distribution has a downward slope
(see Fig. 2). See Ref. [16], for this type of maps which has been used in number
theory, in biology (see Ref. [17]) and in many other areas (see Ref. [18]). See
Ref. [19] for simulations on the pdf generated by Eqn. 7 with λ = 0.
It is to be noted that we cannot generate an exponential distribution from
Eqn. 7 since its maximum variance is 1/2 (for λ = 0) whereas the variance of
the exponential distribution generated by the following Eqn. (See Ref. [8])
mi(t+ 1) = ǫ (mi(t) +mj(t)) (11)
is unity. Hence this model can not generate purely exponential distribution
which is a drawback since recent studies argue that the income/wealth distri-
butions in the real world fits very well with exponential pdfs [1,5,6]. It is trivial
to note that in the usual kinetic exchange models, it is the presence of the
trading partner’s wealth mj(t) (in the i-th agent’s wealth evolution equation;
Eqn. 11) that contributes to the higher variance.
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Fig. 2.
Steady state distributions generated by Eqn. 7 are plotted in the semi-log
plot : Three cases are shown above, viz., λ = 0 (+), λ = 0.4 (×), λ = 0.7
( ∗). All simulations are done for ∼ 105 time steps and averaged over for
∼ 104. Inset : The same data set in the usual plot.
3.2 Power law distribution
We assume λ1 = λ, λ2 = λ3 = 1− λ, −∞ ≤ n ≤ 0 and θ →∞.
The relevant equation is
m(t + 1) = {λ+ ǫ(1− λ)}m(t) + ξ(1− λ)n. (12)
Ref. [22,23] studied this type of discrete stochastic equations (see Eqn. 2 ) as a
generic model for generating power law pdf. But a necessary condition for the
mechanism to generate a power law pdf is that the random multiplicative term
a(t) (λ+ǫ(1−λ) in Eqn. 12) must be greater than 1 sometimes. In the current
context, this condition is not satisfied (according to our interpretation, (λ +
ǫ(1− λ)) is the savings propensity and hence it is always less than unity). To
avoid this problem, we assume a population of agents each of which interacts
with the market according to Eqn. 12. Note that the agents do not interact
among themselves. In the spirit of the kinetic exchange models, we show that
if there is a population of N agents with different λ but each of the income
evolution process is modelled by Eqn. 12, then a power law in the income
distribution will be observed. However, there is an important difference with
the usual kinetic exchange models which are completely conservative. Any
trading activity in such markets would be a zero−sum game i.e., if somebody
wins then his/her trading partner has to lose. We relax that assumption here.
For simulations, we assume that there are 200 agents each endowed with an
initial wealth equals to 1. Each of the agent’s wealth evolution is governed by
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Fig. 3.
A power law distribution (n = −20 in Eqn. 12). The straight line with slope
-1 is drawn as a guide. However, here we take 0≤ λ ≤0.33 because otherwise
the average value of m becomes too large; e.g., Eqn. 13 shows that for λ =
0.5, 〈m〉 = 221.
 1e-06
 1e-05
 0.0001
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 10
 1  10  100
P(
m)
m
Fig. 4.
A power law distribution (n = 0 in Eqn. 12). The straight line with slope -2
is drawn as a guide.
Eqn. 12. Clearly, there is no interactions between the agents. However, the
agents are assigned different λs which are fixed over time for any given agent
(see Ref. [29]). In particular, we assume that λ is uniformly distributed among
the agents. For each agent, simulations are done for ∼ 104 time-steps and the
corresponding pdfs are averaged for ∼ 103 time-steps. Resulting distributions
are averaged over all agents.
Following Ref. [20], a very simple proof is considered below. Note that (in the
steady state) by taking expectations on both sides of Eqn. 12, we can rewrite
it as
(1− λ)1−n〈m〉 = 1 (13)
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The pdf of wealth distributions are drawn for the case n = −20 with global
savings propensities 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3 (from the left to the right) in the
log-log plot. Also, we’ve drawn m−1 in the same diagram (the dotted line).
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The pdf of wealth distributions are drawn for the case n = 0 with global
savings propensities 0.1, 0.5, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.98 (from the left to the right).
Clearly, the average values of wealth at any given savings propensity are very
close to the theoretical values predicted by Eqn. 13. Also, we’ve drawn m−0.5
in the same diagram (the dotted line). Inset: The same diagram in log-log
plot.
By taking total differentiation and rearrenging terms, we get
dλ
dm
=
1
1− nm
−
n−2
n−1 (14)
where m represents 〈m〉. Hence, the average amount of money held by an
agent with a particular λ is given by Eqn. 13. Also, the relation between the
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The pdf of wealth distributions are drawn for the case n = 0 with maximum
savings propensities λM = 0.9, 0.95, 0.975, 0.99 (from the left to the right) in
the log-log plot. The savings propensities of the agents are chosen
deterministically following the rule that λi = (i/N)λM . Also, m
−2 is drawn
for reference (the dotted line).
distribution of λ (i.e., ρ(λ)) with that of m is given by the following Eqn.
P (m)dm = ρ(λ)dλ. (15)
Eqn. 14 and 15 shows that in an population of agents with uniformly dis-
tributed λ, the distribution of m would be
P (m) ∼ m−n−2n−1 . (16)
It is trivial to note that the CCM model (See Ref. [29]; See also Ref. [8])
derived the result analogous to the case where n = 0 (see Fig. 4). Also, if n is
large in modulus then the steady state would be power law distribution with
power -1 (see Fig. 3) (we take n = −20 just for expository purpose).
Following Ref. [8], we can support the above result for the case n = 0. Let
us rewrite Eqn. 12 with the agent index as the following
mi(t+ 1) = {λi + ǫi(1− λi)}mi(t) + ξi(1− λi)n. (17)
which can be rewritten (using Eqn. 13) as
mi(t+ 1) = {λi + ǫi(1− λi)}mi(t) + ξi(1− λi)〈mi〉. (18)
The above equation holds true for all agents i. Since we focus on average
money holding at different savings propensities, we randomly pick any two
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agents i and j (with savings propensities λi and λj respectively) and multiply
their corresponding wealth evolution equations (18), to get
mi(t+ 1)mj(t+ 1)= f
1
ijmi(t)mj(t) + f
2
ij〈mi(t)〉mj(t)
+f 3ijmi(t)〈mj(t)〉+ f 4ij〈mi(t)〉〈mj(t)〉 (19)
where fks are functions of ǫ, ξ, λi and λj for all k. We approximate each of
the quadratic quantities by a mean quantity m2. Note, that here we assumed
that mi can be replaced by its average value 〈mi〉, which holds true only if its
variance is small and that requires n to be as small in modulus as possible in
Eqn. 17. We consider n = 0. Then, we have the following equation
m2(t+ 1) = α(t+ 1)m2(t) where α is a function of fks. . (20)
Ref. [21,8] studied this map and showed that as t→∞,
P (m) ∼ m−2. (21)
Note that this argument holds only if n = 0.
We consider the cases where all agents have the same savings propensities
which we call the global savings propensities (this case is almost identical
to the one described in Section 3.1 in that we consider agents who have the
same λ; the difference is that there we considered only one agent whereas here
we consider N identical agents. Also, another obvious difference is that here
n ≤ 0). The pdfs are drawn for individual savings propensities in Fig. 5 and
6. Let m have a distribution f(m) in the steady state (given λ). With a slight
abuse of notation, we write the value of f(.) evaluated at m = m¯ as f(m¯).
Then Fig. 5 shows that (for n = −20) given λ at m = 〈m〉, fλ(〈m〉) ≈ 〈m〉−1.
Similarly, for n = 0 given λ atm = 〈m〉, fλ(〈m〉) ≈ 〈m〉−0.5. This shows that in
the case where n is large in modulus, the fλ(m) curve is a good approximation
of the average of all the individual wealth distributions which is not true in
the other case where n = 0. The reason is that the probability of finding an
agent within a specified interval of wealth decreases very rapidly with increase
in wealth in the case where n = 0 compared to the other case (this can be
checked very easily from Eqn. 13). Hence, though the uppermost points form
a locus of fλ(〈m〉) ≈ 〈m〉−0.5 for n = 0, the average distribution falls much
more rapidly following P (m) ∼ m−2.
We have also studied the effects of the maximum λ present in the population
on the steady state distribution (for the case n = 0). Following Ref. [24], we
the assign the savings propensities to the agents deterministically, according
to the rule that the i-th agent’s savings propensity λi = (i/N)λM where N
10
is the number of agents in the population, λM < 1 is the maximum savings
propensity in the population. See Fig. 7 for the results. Curves from left to right
represent the distributions for increasing λM . Clearly, as λM decreases, the
power law interval shrinks. Therefore, higher savings propensities contribute
to the formation of the power law interval. This conclusion is consistent with
the findings in Ref. [24]. We should also mention that according to Eqn. 13,
higher λ implies higher average wealth at that particular λ. This fact also
supports the findings in Fig. 7.
3.3 A non-trivial phase transition
Here, we briefly mention that a special case of the map shows a non-trivial
phase transition. If we assume λ1 = λ2 = λ, λ3 = 0, n = 1 and θ = 1. The
equation becomes
m(t + 1) = min{λ(1 + ǫ)m(t), 1} (22)
This map has been used to model opinion formation. Assume that an agent can
have an opinion m(t) within 0 and 1 at any time t. λ is the agent’s conviction
parameter. After each interaction with the society, his opinion changes by a
random fraction. However, the maximum value of opinion that he can have,
is 1. Ref. [26] considered this map and showed that this map shows a phase
transition (with respect to λ) in the average value of m. The critical value
of λ found from simulations, is λc ≈ 0.68 and it only mentions an analytical
result that λc ≈ 0.6796. For numerical details on this particular map, see Ref.
[26]. Interestingly, this map has a parallel in the kinetic exchange models, also
discusses in the same reference (which has a critical point at λc ≈ 0.6667). For
detailed analysis on the nature of such transitions see Ref. [30,31].
Let us now focus on the cases with λ < 1. Consider the map
m(t + 1) = λ(1 + ǫ)m(t). (23)
Let us ignore m(t) for all t ≤ τ where τ is sufficiently large. For any time step
T ≥ τ ,
m(T ) = λT−τ (1 + ǫT )(1 + ǫT−1)...(1 + ǫT−τ+1)m(τ). (24)
Following Ref. [26], we can argue that for λ < λc, the product of all the terms
multiplied to m(τ) in the above equation is less than unity on average. But
this term tends to 1 as λ → λc. Therefore at the critical point (λ = λc), by
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taking logs on both sides we can write
− log λc = 1
T − τ
T∑
k
log (1 + ǫk). (25)
As T → ∞, we apply the LLN and the r.h.s. of the above Eqn. converges to
〈log (1 + ǫ)〉. By applying Jensen’s inequality, we see that
− log λc < log(〈1 + ǫ〉) (26)
i.e., λc > 2/3. Therefore the critical point of the map model is greater than
that of its kinetic exchange version. By numerical calculations from Eqn. 25,
we see that λc ≈ 0.67954 which is very close to the value reported in Ref. [26].
One could also find that 〈log (1+ ǫ)〉 = 2 log 2−1 and therefrom find λc using
Eqn. 25 (see [26]).
It is trivial to note that for λ < λc, m(t) tends to 0. Also at λ = λc, the
distribution has an abrupt change in variance as has been shown numerically
in Ref. [26]. Here, we present a very short proof. By Eqn. 24, 〈m(T )〉 = 〈m(τ)〉
at λ = λc and hence for T − τ sufficiently large,
m(T )− 〈m(T )〉 ≈ λT−τc (1 + ǫT )(1 + ǫT−1)...(1 + ǫT−τ+1)(m(τ)− 〈m(τ)〉).(27)
By squaring and taking expectations on both sides, we get
V (m(T ))≈〈λ2(T−τ)c (1 + ǫT )2(1 + ǫT−1)2...(1 + ǫT−τ+1)2〉V (m(τ))
> 〈λT−τc (1 + ǫT )(1 + ǫT−1)...(1 + ǫT−τ+1)〉2V (m(τ))
= V (m(τ)). (28)
To get the last inequality, note that V (x) = 〈x2〉 − 〈x〉2 > 0 for all x (unless
it is the trivial case that x = 〈x〉). Therefore, V (m(T )) > z(T−τ)V (m(τ)) with
zk > 1 for all k and for all τ . Hence, as t→∞, V (m(t))→∞ at λ = λc.
To illustrate the problem of non-stationarity, we focus on another particular
case where λ→ 1, ǫ ∼ uniform[0, ǫ¯] with ǫ¯→ 0 such that 〈ǫ〉 = − log λ i.e.,
〈ǫ〉 = − log (1− (1− λ)) ≈ 1− λ. From Eqn. 24, by taking logs we get
log m(T ) = (T − τ) log λ+
T∑
k
log (1 + ǫk) + log m(τ)
≈
T∑
k
(ǫk − 〈ǫk〉) + log m(τ). (29)
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Multiplying both sides by 1/
√
T and by applying CLT (assuming T → ∞),
we get
1√
T
log m(T ) → N(0, σ2) in distribution, (30)
where σ2 is the variance of ǫ. Hence, m(T ) is distributed log-normally. But
evidently, the distribution is not stationary.
3.4 The law of proportionate effect
We assume λ1 = λ2 = 1, λ3 = 0 and θ → ∞. Note that this is the limit of
the case discussed above with λ = 1 and θ sufficiently large. In this case, the
equation becomes
m(t + 1) = (1 + ǫt+1)m(t) (31)
which is very wellknown as a generator of log-normal distribution (See Ref.
[3]). To find the distribution of m(t), note that the above equation can be
rewritten (by iteration) as
m(t + 1) =
t∏
k
(1 + ǫk)m(1) (32)
and by taking log on both sides, it can be written as
log m(t+ 1)=
t∑
k
log (1 + ǫk) + log m(1)
≈
t∑
k
ǫk + log m(1) (for ǫ very small).
(33)
By applying the Central Limit Theorem, we see that log m(t) is distributed
normally, hence m(t) is distributed log-normally. However, evidently the dis-
tribution generated this way is not stationary either.
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4 Summary
In recent years, a number of economic regularities have been investigated in
the econophysics literature, one of the most prominent themes being the distri-
butions of income/wealth. The two candidate distributions for explaining the
left tail and the mode of the distributions of income/wealth are Gamma and
Log-normal. There is a consensus that the heavy right tail is best described
by a power law (See Ref. [1,8]). Also, the process of opinion formation due to
interactions among numerous agents have been studied in details. The phe-
nomena of emerging consensus and a phase transition in the opinion formation
have been tried to be modelled in many ways (See Ref. [25,26]).
In this paper, we examine a stochastic map to model the economic process of
income/wealth distribution and the sociological process of opinion formation.
We showed that this particular map can generate a positively skewed pdf and
a power law pdf. It shows a non-trivial phase-transition and in another limit,
it coincides with a very well known generator of log-normal pdf. However,
there are several drawbacks of this approach. One is that the algebraic form
of the pdf generated by the Eqn. 3 is not known and it is not a Γ pdf (at
one limit it has a sharp peak which eventually goes away). Second is the well
known problem with Eqn. 31 that the distribution generated by this equation
is not stationary. Third, purely exponential distribution cannot be generated
by this model. But there are a number of recent studies concluding that the
income/wealth distribution can be modelled by exponential pdf [1,5,6]. Pre-
viously, the kinetic exchange models have been successful to model many of
these phenomena [8,26]. We show that there are some new results produced
by this map model whereas other results mostly conform with those derived
in the kinetic exchange models.
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